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Abstract 
Most modern knowledge is not science. The physical sciences have successfully validated theories to infer they can be used 
universally to predict in previously unexperienced circumstances. According to the conventional conception of science such 
inferences are falsified by a single irregular outcome. And verification is by the scientific method which requires strict 
regularity of outcome and establishes cause and effect.   
Medicine, medical research and many “soft” sciences are concerned with individual people in complex heterogeneous 
populations. These populations cannot be tested to demonstrate strict regularity of outcome in every individual. Neither 
randomised controlled trials nor observational studies in medicine are science in the conventional conception. Establishing 
and using medical and other “soft science” theories cannot be scientific. It requires conceptually different means: requiring 
expert judgement applying all available evidence in the relevant available factual matrix.  
The practice of medicine is observational. Prediction of outcomes for the individual requires professional expertise 
applying available medical knowledge and evidence. Expertise in any profession can only be acquired through experience. 
Prior cases are the fundament of knowledge and expertise in medicine. Case histories, studies and series can provide 
knowledge of extremely high reliability applicable to establishing reliable general theories and falsifying others. Their 
collation, study and analysis should be a priority in medicine. Their devaluation as evidence, the failure to apply their 
lessons, the devaluation of expert professional judgement and the attempt to emulate the scientific method are all historic 
errors in the theory and practice of modern medicine. 
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Introduction 
 
“In recent years, ... a wide range of … major professional 
and patient societies of global clinical importance, have 
collectively articulated increasing and widespread concern 
at a deepening crisis within medicine – a crisis of 
knowledge, compassion, care and costs.  ... alongside … an 
exponential rise in the incidence and prevalence of chronic 
and comorbid disease, we arrive at an astonishing picture 
of the current status of health services in our world today 
…” [1]. 
 
“Putting medicine ‘right again’ will therefore necessitate an 
urgent and fundamental reappraisal of the nature of 
knowledge for clinical practice and an appreciation that by 
no means all of the knowledge centrally necessary for 
effective clinical practice is scientific in its nature. Such 
knowledge is not unscientific, but rather non-scientific” 
[2]. 
 
“... we need more accurately to distinguish between 
scientific, unscientific and non-scientific forms of 
knowledge as they relate to the Profession of Medicine, 
otherwise old arguments will continue to escape 
resolution.” [Personal communication Andrew Miles, 
December 2011].  
 
“As medicine has become more powerfully scientific, it has 
also become increasingly depersonalised, so that in some 
areas of clinical practice an over-reliance on science in the 
care of patients has led to the substitution of scientific 
medicine with scientistic medicine and an accompanying 
collapse of humanistic values in the profession of 
medicine” [3]. 
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Is medical knowledge scientific and medical research 
science? If not, what information should we use in 
medicine, how should we obtain it, and how should we 
apply it? What does it mean to speak of medicine as 
“powerfully scientific”? The terms “science” and 
“scientific” have ceased to have a useful meaning. In the 
academic world and in medical publishing, the terms 
“science” and “scientific” have, in fact, become so debased 
that it is no longer possible to know what they really mean. 
In the current paper, we aim to analyse, clarify and take 
frank issue with the notion that medicine is a science. 
What does ‘science’ mean?   
The conventional conception of science taught to 
generations of school children was one which, as U.S. 
President John F Kennedy put it: “... Science, technology, 
and education can be the ally of every nation. Never before 
has man had such capacity to control his own environment, 
... We have the power to make this the best generation of 
mankind in the history of the world ...” [4]. Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson, in his famous 1963 “White Heat of 
Technology” speech put it this way: “The Britain that is 
going to be forged in the white heat of this [scientific] 
revolution will be no place for restrictive practices or for 
outdated methods on either side of industry” [5]. 
There are now many pretenders to the throne of the 
physical sciences, where “… the successes of the natura1 
sciences have also tempted many to borrow the manners, 
the trappings, of these fields, in hopes of looking 
'scientific'” [6]. The term “science” is employed in various 
fields to garner epistemic respectability for knowledge 
gained. The study of politics and political science is 
portrayed as science, as also is educational research [7]. 
The words “science” and “scientific” are now used in 
numerous and conflicting senses. On the one hand 
“science” is used to describe a process of investigation and 
study which generates information of exceptional 
reliability, like that in the physical sciences. But obtaining 
reliable knowledge is not science. Any knowledge, 
scientific or other, when proposed as evidence stands or 
falls on its own inherent reliability, which must be 
subjected to scrutiny and testing on a case-by-case [8]. 
Scientific knowledge when presented as evidence is no 
different from any other kinds of knowledge in this 
respect.  
The terms “science” and “scientific” are also loosely 
used as labels for all kinds of empirical studies of varying 
reliability to heighten their status and foster acceptance. 
What is Science? 
Strictly defined, “science” means the physical sciences, the 
“hard” sciences such as physics and chemistry. These 
disciplines are the benchmarks for science, the biological 
sciences less so. Physics, for example, has been so 
successful in validating theories that many are used for 
universal application anywhere in time and space to predict 
the outcomes of previously unknown circumstances.  
Lofty descriptions of science in general are 
misleading, such as “the aims of science are ...” European 
anti-trust law (i.e., competition law) addresses the 
economic “object or effect” of practices by those in a 
position of market dominance [9]. In science, irrespective 
of what the individual scientist’s motivation may be for 
practising science (the object), it is the outcomes which are 
definitional: the results and discoveries achieved from 
tireless, unshakeable scientific enquiry (the effects), which 
have given us cars, computers, smart phones, air travel and 
all manner of other devices and constructions. 
The conventional conception of 
Science 
The science taught to students over the past 60 years could 
be termed the “conventional conception of science” [10-
12]. It is an idealised version which does not represent how 
all science is done in the real world, with its sometimes 
confused philosophy and external influences: addressed 
over centuries by leading thinkers including Francis 
Bacon, William Whewell, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, 
Bertrand Russell, Ernst Mach, Pierre Duhem, Rudolf 
Carnap, W.V.O. Quine, Werner Heisenberg, Paul 
Feyerabend, Russell Hanson, David Bohm, Herbert Simon, 
Paul Thagard, Imre Lakatos, Carl Hempel and Larry 
Laudan [11,13-19]. With regard to this school-taught, 
faultless view of scientific inquiry, Haack, notes the New
Cynicist view that: 
“the supposed ideal of honest inquiry, respect for evidence, 
concern for truth, is a kind of illusion, a smokescreen 
disguising the operations of power, politics and rhetoric” 
[13]. Medical students are taught an idealised version, 
where scientists say “Let's assume there's no difference; 
now let's try to disprove that theory.” ...Setting up 
falsifiable hypotheses which you then proceed to test is the 
very essence of the scientific method” [20]. 
“Soft” vs. “Hard” Science 
“Soft” science fields cannot match the success that the 
physical, “hard” sciences, such as chemistry and physics 
have achieved. Psychology and political science, for 
example, are fields of inquiry which are properly called 
“soft science”. It is not possible to test their theories by 
experiments, achieve strict regularity of outcomes or to 
validate them scientifically.  The consequences are 
significant and can be seen from Box 1. 
Strevens has written that ‘The three cardinal aims of 
science are prediction, control, and explanation; but the 
greatest of these is explanation. Also the most inscrutable: 
prediction aims at truth ... Explanation, by contrast, aims at 
scientific understanding ...’ [21]. In dealing with fields of 
study which call themselves a “science”, but which cannot 
predict as true science can then clearly such subjects 
should not be described in such fashion. The alternative is 
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we must teach schoolchildren, undergraduates, the media 
and the public more about what science is and that the 
knowledge we gain from it is far from the certain 
knowledge the public and many engaged in science believe 
it to be. 
 
Scientific Pretenders 
 
In recent decades, systematic fields of study, recognized as 
such with the suffix “ology”, such as gerontology, have 
become transformed into a “science”, alongside the 
physical sciences. Some even go so far to say that 
marketing is a science [22]. 
The word “science” has been stripped of its true 
meaning. Susan Haack (in 2012) puts it this way: 
“And as the prestige of the sciences grew, words like 
“science,” “scientifically,” etc., took on an honorific tone: 
….. Advertisers routinely boast that “science has shown” 
the superiority of their product, or that “scientific studies” 
support their claims. Traditional or unconventional 
medica1 treatments are often dismissed out of hand, not as 
ill-founded or untested, but as “unscientific.” Skeptical of 
some claim, we may ask, not “is there any good evidence 
for that?” but “is there any scientific evidence for that?” 
...... whether expert testimony is reliable enough to be 
admitted, the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that such 
testimony must be “scientific knowledge,” arrived at by the 
“scientific method.” The titles of conferences and books 
speak of “Science and Reason,” as if the sciences had a 
monopoly on reason itself [6].  
The adoption of “science” as a descriptive term is an 
attempt to achieve the same epistemic value that “science” 
is perceived to have in generating knowledge when the 
“soft sciences” cannot deliver that value. This is not to say 
that the soft sciences cannot generate reliable knowledge. 
They may, but their methods of inquiry are qualitatively 
quite different from those associated with the physical 
sciences. 
 
Science and Pretenders - 
conceptually different modes of 
enquiry 
In testing by experiment, “pure” or hard sciences exclude 
all information external to an experiment. Tests that the 
soft sciences conduct do not have that luxury. To decide 
whether their theories may have validity they deal with a 
broader range of information and are dependent upon 
culling evidence from a “factual matrix” [8]. This 
distinction is not the demarcation of Popper [16]. That has 
been described as “the fruitless preoccupation with the 
problem of demarcating real science from pretenders” [13]. 
How we should approach validation, acceptance and the 
application of theories in the soft sciences - their warrant 
or justification as knowledge - is conceptually 
fundamentally different from the conventional conception 
of science and from demarcation and that is irrespective of 
whether the physical sciences in all respects themselves 
always fulfil the strict application of the scientific method. 
Demarcation itself appears not an absolute.  Russell wrote 
“I mean by ‘hard’ data those which resist the solvent 
influence of critical reflection, and by ‘soft’ data those 
which, under the operation of this process, become to our 
minds more or less doubtful. The hardest of hard data are 
of two sorts: the particular facts of sense, and the general 
truths of logic” [17]. That conception, however, puts 
physical sciences firmly at one end of any notional 
spectrum of “hardness”. How we should approach the 
validation and acceptance of theories in the “soft sciences” 
appears a less well examined issue. 
Medicine and medical research  
The historic aim of medicine is to care, comfort and 
console in addition to ameliorating, attenuating and curing 
disease in the individual person [3]. It is a profession, or a 
vocation, but not science. The practice of medicine treats 
distinct individuals in heterogeneous populations. Indeed, 
as former BMJ Editor Richard Smith puts it, “Doctors are 
not scientists … Most doctors … [i]n their methods of 
working … are more like jazz musicians …” [23].  
No two patients are the same. Diagnosis is not precise 
or often even right. Treatments vary widely in their 
effectiveness and efficacy. Medicine has its successes and 
failures in individual cases. As Osler said, “Medicine is an 
art of probabilities, or at best, a science of uncertainty” 
[24]. In retrospect, it is unfortunate that he employed the 
word “science” in his description of medicine, as if 
medicine were some form of it.   
Medical research focuses on the systematic collection 
of information about diseases in individual patients in 
order to gain knowledge and understanding of their 
 
Box 1 Scientific Validation of Theories  
 
 
 
A) Psychology: 
In psychology experiments the participants are an 
heterogeneous group.  Each is a singular irregular 
“experiment”. The outcome may be that 70% respond in the 
expected manner but 30% do not.  A theory cannot predict 
which participant will respond as expected or when but only 
what the probability might be in any case. A scientific theory 
will be falsified by any one of the 30% of irregular outcomes.  
Whether such a theory should be applied to any future case 
requires professional judgement, experience and all the 
evidence relevant to the case. 
 
B) Space Exploration: 
If theories were established as valid 70% of the time, the 
crew and funders of a space mission would have to accept 
that for nearly one launch in three the craft could fail to 
launch, complete its mission and return. 
A successful mission also relies on numerous theories all 
being right and not just one.  If each theory were right 70% 
of the time, for a combination of such theories the probability 
of their being right and hence the spacecraft completing its 
mission and returning safely could be an exceptionally small 
one and space exploration might be unlikely to be 
undertaken. 
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pathophysiology and to formulate treatment. Such research 
does not seek to predict new or rare diseases. It is a 
practical and intellectual endeavour that is not and cannot 
be constrained by “the scientific method”, as employed by 
the hard sciences. 
Is there a scientific method? 
The conventional conception of science teaches that 
scientific enquiry seeks to establish theories which explain 
the natural world. The scientific method, used to conduct 
experiments, is an essential component of this endeavour. 
Investigators use it to test hypotheses and establish them as 
theories, or, depending on the experimental results, to 
falsify and discard them. It is the process by which theories 
are validated to create a reliable, consistent and non-
arbitrary explanation for observed and predicted 
phenomena. The scientific method is the standard approach 
investigators employ in experiments to minimise bias and 
expunge prejudice. Used appropriately, this process 
generates specific information to a high degree of 
certainty.  
The importance of experimental testing to science and 
the scientific method is notable in Thomas Kuhn’s seminal 
222-page essay, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” 
[11]. The work contains 146 instances of the term 
“experiment” and “experimental”. This exemplifies that 
throughout the philosophy of science, scientific experiment 
is and has been an essential part of science for at least 400 
years following Bacon [14].  
Scientific enquiry is a specialised subset of decision-
making. The conventional conception of the scientific 
method involves four main elements: 1) the observation 
and description of phenomena; 2) an hypothesis to explain 
the phenomena; 3) use of the hypothesis to predict either 
other phenomena or the qualitative results of new 
observations and 4) repeated experimental tests of 
predictions in properly performed experiments 
reproducibly carried out by other researchers 
independently of each other.  
In physics and chemistry, the scientific method 
addresses narrow, closely defined questions (hypotheses) 
tested by carefully designed experiments to elicit a narrow 
range of evidence of high reliability. The method usually 
tests a single variable in closely controlled conditions to 
eliminate any confounding variables or factors. But in 
medicine, evidence employed for making diagnoses and 
determining treatment in individual patients is disparate 
and wide-ranging.  
Consensus has no place in the scientific method for 
testing hypotheses. Repeatedly in the history of science 
and medicine, the scientific method is a singular tool 
which overthrows a widely accepted theory supported by a 
majority consensus of scientists or physicians and shows 
that the consensus is wrong. Marshall and Warren provide 
a salutary example in this context with their 1982 
discovery demonstrating the role of the bacterium 
Helicobacter pylori in gastritis and peptic ulcer disease 
[25]. 
Without the high standards required of evidence in 
science it would be impossible to achieve the certainty and 
the success of the application of science to modern 
technologies. Each increment of scientific knowledge is 
based upon numerous prior theories holding good as the 
scientific base upon and from which new or improved 
knowledge and theories can be discovered and established. 
There is now a substantial established body of scientific 
knowledge. Some fields such as geometric optics have 
ceased to yield research problems and have instead become 
tools for engineering [11]. 
In carrying out a scientific experiment, those involved 
tacitly assume and must be sure they can assume that the 
myriad scientific theories unpinning every facet of the 
design and performance of the experiment hold good and 
which underlie the general physical environment within 
which the experiment is conducted.  It is, for example, 
assumed the measuring apparatus used will work and will 
continue to work as designed in accordance with the 
predictions of each element of science underlying that 
design and construction. Thus, the experimenters assume, 
subject to routine calibration and recalibration, that they 
can, all else being equal, for the duration of the experiment 
always rely on the measurements recorded by that 
apparatus within known and stated bounds of accuracy of 
the instrumentation concerned. Duhem recognised that, as 
any experiment is theory-laden, falsification does not 
falsify the hypothesis under test, but all the assumptions 
and theories underlying the design and execution of the 
experiment in addition to the tested hypothesis: “Tests of 
models are not tests of theories” [18]. Quine propounded 
that this applies not only to confirmation of scientific 
theories, but to all knowledge claims whilst Laudan argued 
that the significance of such underdetermination has been 
greatly exaggerated [19]. 
Science and soft science part 
company 
The success of science is grounded on two things: 1) its 
high standard of proof, requiring strict regularity of 
experimental outcomes and 2) each element of scientific 
knowledge underpinning the acquisition of new knowledge 
has been established to a high degree of certainty. No 
GIGO (garbage in equals garbage out) for science [26]. 
The ability to test by experiment under these two 
conditions is the defining point at which science and the 
soft sciences part company. We apply the theories and 
knowledge obtained by science. We combine each of a 
myriad of discrete items of such theories and knowledge. 
We apply them in technology with a high degree of 
confidence.  
Another characteristic that distinguishes science from 
soft science is having theories that provide accurate and 
reliable prediction. Prediction must work in existing 
previously observed and unobserved cases and in wholly 
new cases (e.g., calculating what the force of gravity on the 
moon was before astronauts landed there). The inventor of 
the term “scientist”, William Whewell (1794–1866), a 
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polymath,  Master of Trinity College Cambridge England 
and one of the most influential figures in nineteenth 
century Britain, specified tests scientific theories should 
pass in order to be accepted as empirical truth: 
  
“Our hypotheses ought to fortel [foretell] phenomena 
which have not yet been observed” …… They should 
“explain and determine cases of a kind different from those 
which were contemplated in the formation” of those 
hypotheses and hypotheses must “become more coherent” 
over time [15]. 
 
Science systematises data - raw facts and figures with 
no significance beyond its existence - and information - 
meaningful data, useful or not - into knowledge that has 
predictive ability and a high degree of certainty, followed 
by understanding—the process by which new knowledge 
can be derived from existing knowledge. (The fifth and 
ultimate stage, wisdom, is the ability to increase the 
effectiveness of existing knowledge and understanding, 
perceive outcomes and determine their value) [8].  
Science seeks knowledge with which to understand the 
workings of nature. Laying the foundations of the modern 
scientific method for seeking knowledge, Francis Bacon 
recognized that it is only applicable to a small part of 
knowledge of the natural world and is not applicable to all 
knowledge of it. In 1620, he wrote in his Novum Organum, 
responding to the argument posed that nothing can be 
known: 
 
“XXXVII. Our method and that of the sceptics' agree in 
some respects at first setting out, but differ most widely, 
and are completely opposed to each other in their 
conclusion; for they roundly assert that nothing can be 
known; we, that but a small part of nature can be known, 
...” [14]. 
 
Now we ask, 400 years later: “Is the scientific method 
the only route to reliable knowledge, particularly in 
medicine?” 
Is medical research and its 
outcomes scientific?  
Medicine focuses on causation and asks “does X cause Y?” 
If investigators establish that it does, then the next question 
they ask is “why does X cause Y?” But it is not as simple 
as that. A serious shortcoming of the “X causes Y” 
paradigm in medicine, in heterogeneous populations of 
complex organisms - individual patients and experimental 
laboratory animals - is that most biological effects do not 
have a single cause. In order for an “X” to cause outcome 
“Y”, other factors often need to be present. X might be 
observed to be the cause of Y all else being equal, 
meaning that all other factors necessary for this outcome 
must also be present and held invariant. A road traffic 
accident, for instance, might not have occurred if the road 
was not wet or a warning sign were present or the car was 
not driven quite so fast. An experiment reconstructing a 
road traffic accident would need to incorporate these 
features. 
Medical research and experiment 
Medical researchers are often not able to establish by 
observation or experiment that a given X causes outcome 
Y in individual patients or in animals in the laboratory. 
Intervening with X may generate outcome Y sometimes, 
but not every time and in some individuals, not at all. To 
further confound matters, outcome Y may occur when X is 
not present. Confronted with dissimilar results like this, it 
would be difficult to claim that medical experiments and 
resulting theories are scientific. 
Replication and publication 
Even without these hurdles, publishing a medical paper 
that claims its findings establish and validate (or falsify) a 
new hypothesis will not meet the strictures of the scientific 
method. Other investigators operating independently of 
each other need to be able to replicate the findings of the 
original study and in practice this is difficult if not 
impossible in medicine. 
Pre-publication journal peer review, whatever its 
agenda may be, is not scientific peer review [27]. As 
Greenhalgh puts it in the British Medical Journal (of all 
places): “It usually comes as a surprise to students to learn 
that some (perhaps most) published articles belong in the 
bin, and should certainly not be used to inform practice” 
[20]. 
Randomised controlled trials 
Authorities consider randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 
to be the most reliable evidence in medicine and picture 
them as the “gold standard” of medical evidence. When 
properly done and blinded, researchers conduct these trials 
in a systematic, methodical and rigorous fashion. 
Nevertheless, randomised controlled trials are not science. 
This is especially the case with large scale RCTs claiming 
that a statistically significant treatment effect can be seen 
in an unidentifiable, small sub-group of a heterogeneous 
population, thus justifying treatment of that population 
with a particular drug [28]. This is wholly different from 
the successful application of science to technology. A 
senior executive of one of the world’s largest drug 
companies (GlaxoSmithKline) admits, “It is an open secret 
within the drugs industry that most of its products are 
ineffective in most patients” [29]. 
Although touted as being scientific, randomised 
controlled trials mostly generate just information and that 
of a statistical nature. RCTs are short on knowledge and 
understanding. Such trials frame their findings in terms of 
statistical significance and are subject to inappropriately 
bestowing causal relationships to statistical associations 
[28]. Furthermore, RCTs provide no knowledge to predict 
the outcome of treatment or its risks in an individual 
patient. RCTs do not tell us: when factor X can be 
predicted to cause outcome Y in a particular patient; that X 
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is the only cause or factor in the cause of Y; when X does 
not cause Y; why or when Y will appear when X is not 
present. RCTs therefore cannot verify hypotheses about 
when or why X does or does not cause Y. RCTs also 
provide no information enabling us to predict new 
outcomes in addition to Y. RCTs provide no mechanism 
for prediction beyond a probability of how often we might 
expect X to cause Y.  RCTs also provide no knowledge to 
predict the outcome of a treatment involving two or more 
drugs of unknown interactivity. Meta-analyses (systematic 
reviews) that combine RCTs addressing the same question 
have their own set of problems and biases [30]. 
Other unscientific medical evidence: 
epidemiology and case studies 
Epidemiology is concerned with the incidence of disease in 
populations and does not answer the question of what is 
the cause of an individual’s disease [31]. Observational 
statistical studies tell us that X is seen in association with 
Y, not that it is the cause of Y. The assessment of causality 
is a matter of judgement, made with careful attention to the 
criteria identified for such purposes by the US Surgeon 
General, Bradford Hill and others in evaluating clinical 
information regarding the cases [32-34]. Beyond a 
probability of how often we might see X and Y together in 
a population, they tell us nothing to predict when X and Y 
will be seen in any particular individual. 
Emphasising the importance of individual clinical 
information in epidemiologic studies, Sir Richard Doll 
took many years to establish smoking as a cause of cancer. 
He had difficulty in obtaining high quality data and 
thousands of subjects were needed. If 10% or more of 
cases had incomplete medical histories, the possibility of 
an unpredictable excess of cases of interest in those 10% 
meant the hypothesis could not be proven. His advice was 
that, since epidemiological studies could take years and 
still be wrong, reliable evidence in a shorter timeframe 
could be obtained from evaluating clinical data from 
detailed medical histories of as many affected cases as 
possible and basing conclusions on that [Personal 
communication Dr A P Fletcher: April 2012]. 
Basic observational research of well documented case 
studies provides information that doctors need to diagnose 
and treat patients appropriately. Today, patients are 
suffering because not enough basic observational case 
study clinical research is being done [35]. This is a 
consequence of following the philosophically, theoretically 
and empirically flawed theories of evidence-based 
medicine, which relegate such evidence to a low level in its 
flawed hierarchy of evidence [8].  
Medicine is not searching the universe for evidence of 
“black holes” nor is in the business of building space 
shuttles. Not being a science, its hypotheses and theories 
cannot meet the scientific standard of proof that requires 
strict regularity of outcomes in all cases: a level of 
evidence that is irrefutable. For the practice of medicine, 
meeting such a standard is impossible, inappropriate and 
unnecessary. It does not need to meet the same high level 
of evidence and standard of proof as science. Case studies 
that provide a civil level of evidence that is “more likely 
than not”, or, at best, a criminal level of evidence that is 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” will serve. Evidence from 
cases, case series and studies however can provide high 
certainty of knowledge even to the standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
Other unscientific information and 
knowledge 
Much of the information and knowledge doctors use to 
practise medicine comes from observation and experience, 
not medical research. Treatments in most of the medical 
specialties have not been proven safe and effective by 
RCTs, or by any other kind of experiment. Adverse drug 
reactions are poorly monitored. In many cases they are said 
to be reported only 2% of the time [36]. Indeed, as some 
observers note, “It is possible that some entire medical 
subspecialties are based on little evidence. Their 
disappearance probably would not harm patients .....” [37].  
No requirements exist to prove with appropriate 
evidence the safety and efficacy of established practices in 
modern allopathic medicine. But with regard to 
complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), health 
authorities demand scientific proof of its safety and 
efficacy, despite the fact that most of modern medicine 
fails to meet that standard. The pharmaceutical industry 
has its origins in herbal medicine and these treatments 
remain of continuing commercial importance to it. And in 
China, with its sophisticated culture and long history, 
physicians use herbal treatments and acupuncture routinely 
in their medical practice. 
CAM research is grossly underfunded in First World 
nations. The U.S. National Institutes of Health devotes 
90% of its annual budget for medical research, US$ 30.9 
billion, to pharmaceutically-oriented Western medicine 
and just 0.004% (US$ 132 million) to CAM research 
[38,39]. (And it did not start supporting any kind of CAM 
research until 1992). 
Absence of predictive certainty 
The practice of medicine functions without the level of 
certainty essential to science, recognizing the inherent 
uncertainties involved in researching, treating and making 
theories about complex heterogeneous biological 
organisms. 
Andrew Miles and Michael Loughlin, in their editorial 
“Models in the balance: evidence-based medicine versus 
evidence-informed individualised care” for the Journal of 
Evaluation in Clinical Practice, make this observation: 
“Exponential increases in technological and biomedical 
advance over the last 100 years or so have radically 
transformed the scope, possibility and power of clinical 
practice, driving enormous shifts in individual and 
population health” [40].  
As biomedical advances occur, medical theories are 
followed and applied, exactly correct or not. Albeit 
imperfect, they provide a framework for understanding. 
European Journal for Person Centered Healthcare 
 
 
 
7 
The germ theory of disease is one example. There are a 
large number of asymptomatic people infected with the 
bacterium Helicobacter pylori, but who do not have peptic 
ulcers [41]. Most diseases are multifactorial and pathogens 
are just one, perhaps necessary, but alone insufficient, 
factor for disease causes to be present.  Failure to recognise 
this stifles attempts to identify other necessary factors 
causing a particular disease that requires treatment. With 
evidence-informed individualised care replacing flawed 
evidence-based medicine, perhaps this new and better way 
of practising medicine will produce, alongside existing 
theories of immunity, a more certain and operative germ - 
and - nutritional deficiency theory of disease [8,40]. 
This all suggests that the scientific method, the types 
of evidence it admits and that which it rejects and the 
standard of proof applied in science are less relevant to and 
in any event unattainable in medicine, but that 
improvements can be identified and should be 
implemented. The foregoing also raises the question: to 
achieve this goal what methods, evidence and standards of 
proof should be applied in medicine? And since it is not a 
science, what kind of knowledge should be brought to bear 
in medical theory and practice? 
Can unscientific knowledge provide 
certainty? 
A single well documented, spontaneous case report of 
“rechallenge” or three such cases of “dechallenge” prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt, if not irrefutably, that 
intervention X causes disease (outcome) Y [42].  
Rechallenge (e.g., a drug causes an adverse effect when 
given a second time exactly the same way it did when 
given the first time) and dechallenge (where the adverse 
effect goes away when the drug is metabolised and 
removed from the body) are special examples where a case 
report and case series prove causality.   
In law, three cases of a well documented “challenge” 
series (in the cases concerned where the subjects did not 
recover from the challenge and died) provides a level of 
evidence that is “beyond a reasonable doubt”, the criminal 
standard of proof required in capital cases, like R v 
Smith [43]. (A sentence of death by hanging was imposed 
on Smith, who took a different name each time he married 
and pre-meditatedly murdered each of his three new brides 
in the bath, in a manner which looked like they had 
drowned accidentally, obtaining substantial inheritance 
sums on each death.) 
In case series, researchers need to evaluate the fullest 
factual matrix possible for each case to compare cases and 
assess them. This is not “science” in its conventional sense, 
but a wholly different form of investigation freed of 
experiments and blinded controls, where none of the 
various disparate independent pieces of evidence alone can 
found a conclusion but together they can. This form of 
investigation, on a day-to-day basis, provides knowledge, 
of high certainty and understanding.  
Vandenbroucke shows that case reports and case series 
“…Permit discovery of new diseases and unexpected 
effects (adverse or beneficial) as well as the study of 
mechanisms, and they play an important role in medical 
education” [44]. Although EBM relegates them to second-
class status, case reports and case series are a means of 
obtaining valuable and reliable information of potentially 
exceptionally high certainty. And as Flyvbjerg 
demonstrates, all experts operate on the basis of intimate 
knowledge of several thousand cases in their areas of 
expertise. It is experience with these cases, particularly the 
paradigmatic and extreme ones, that transforms a beginner 
into an expert. Reliable rapid expert intuitive decision-
making can be developed “after thousands of hours of 
practice” [45].  
Flyvbjerg notes, citing Kuhn, that scientific activity is 
acknowledged or rejected as good science by how closely it 
relates to one or more paradigmatic cases or exemplars - 
cases that highlight more general characteristics. He argues 
and demonstrates, that whilst case study methods are 
widely used in social science they are held in low regard - 
and wrongly so. He attributes this to their being poorly 
understood and contrary to common conception: 1) 
general, theoretical knowledge is not more valuable than 
knowledge of individual cases; 2) generalisation on the 
basis of individual cases is possible and the case studies 
can contribute to scientific development (“scientific” in the 
sense of “soft” and “hard” sciences); 3) case studies are 
suitable for hypothesis testing and theory building; 4) case 
studies can be used for verification and falsification and do 
not merely tend to confirm a researcher’s preconceived 
notions and 5) case studies can be used to summarize and 
develop general propositions and theories [45].  
Medicine is fundamentally observational and 
dependent upon its practice for knowledge of prior cases 
and their outcomes coupled with the exercise of 
professional judgement. Acknowledging the role of case 
reports and case series in pharmacology (rechallenge and 
dechallenge adverse drug reactions), similar fact 
(challenge) case series in law, the vital importance of case 
studies in the social sciences and the development of 
human intuitive expert decision-making based on long 
practical experience with individual cases, it is clear that 
the primary and most essential source of information in 
medicine is well-documented cases. 
Non-scientific information 
Professionals have knowledge, skill and experience. They 
do not acquire these qualities through science, nor do they 
make assessments and judgements in a scientific manner 
[46].  
Describing the practice of medicine as an art is as 
unfortunate as is calling it science. The term “art” used this 
way is vague and fosters clouded thinking on the subject. 
As applied to medicine, it denotes the application of 
knowledge, understanding and wisdom in making medical 
decisions [8]. That some physicians are more successful at 
this than others and make better decisions with better 
outcomes is what makes medicine an “art”. Different 
musicians may perform the same works, but some are 
considered to perform them better than others. 
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Medical professionals have to make causal judgements 
in individual cases whilst addressing broad real world day-
to-day questions. “If in all the known circumstances 
including Mrs Smith’s clinical history to date can we 
achieve outcome X if we apply treatment Y?” This 
patient’s doctor cannot answer this question in a scientific 
manner. The approach evidence-based medicine takes to 
medical decision-making is flawed and, fortunately, is now 
being replaced by evidence-informed individualised care. 
[40] Real world medical decision-making is based upon a 
variety of evidence in the factual matrix relevant to any 
clinical case [8].  
In medicine, experienced physicians can acquire 
sufficient intuitive knowledge and skill to be able to make 
expert and reliable intuitive decisions. Kahneman and 
Klein show that intuitive decisions can be trusted “[i]f the 
environment is sufficiently regular and if the judge has a 
chance to learn its regularities, the associative machinery 
will recognize situations and generate quick and accurate 
predictions and decisions.” …. “If an anesthesiologist says, 
‘I have a feeling something is wrong,’ everyone in the 
operating room should be prepared for an emergency” … 
“Anesthesiologists are …. in a better position to develop 
useful intuitive skills” … “because the effects of their 
actions are likely to be quickly evident”, whereas “…. 
radiologists obtain little information about the accuracy of 
the diagnoses they make and about the pathologies they 
fail to detect” [47]. Indeed, the intuitive knowledge and 
skill and diagnostic reliability of radiologists (and 
physicians in other specialities), might be improved by 
using online libraries of well documented medical cases 
for reference and study as a substitute for missing 
immediate feedback. Libraries of well documented medical 
cases should be used (in place of multiple choice 
questions) in Maintenance of Certification examinations in 
the various specialities. 
Law, Medicine and Science 
Law has an existing sound, practical, working and tried 
and tested framework for making evidence-based 
decisions. Lawyers learn that legal knowledge comes from 
centuries of trial (literally and in all its meanings) and error 
- and from the thinking of some of the finest legal minds. 
Legal issues can involve both life and liberty. In law, like 
medicine, outcomes of trials can involve life and death. 
Evidential inference combines facts with generalisations to 
produce networks of inferences [48]. 
In medicine, physicians lack knowledge on how to 
approach evidence and its assessment. Physicians would 
do well in making medical decisions to emulate law (and 
science) and be aware of the level of evidence used for 
making a particular decision - “more likely than not” or 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” (from law), or “irrefutable” 
(in science). Medicine would do well to take into account 
and apply by analogy the knowledge and lessons of law. 
The same observation can be applied throughout the “soft” 
sciences.   
Science is a “one trick pony”. It has one main 
approach to proving an hypothesis: testing by experiment. 
In testing hypotheses, science excludes all relevant 
evidence other than that gained by experiment, carried out 
within the framework of existing knowledge. 
A diagnosis in medicine is like an hypothesis in 
science. But given the probabilistic nature of medical 
knowledge, physicians must use their professional 
judgement to arrive at a diagnosis; which is tested through 
treatment. Making a diagnosis is not a scientific process. It 
is, however, a systematic and methodical one, aided by 
experience, intuition and appropriate evidence (like X-rays 
and blood cultures). 
In law, new approaches to the study of evidence, proof 
and fact finding are being explored to improve methods of 
decision-making in complex cases [48-50]. Such studies 
are not specific to the calling of lawyers. “Medicine needs 
to develop a better understanding of the nature of evidence 
and of evidential proof, by emulating law’s approach to 
evidence” [42]. Medicine is not science and it and other 
“soft” sciences can learn more from law than from trying 
to copy science. 
Conclusion 
Medicine is not science and can learn more from fields like 
law and the way law handles evidence, than by trying to 
copy science. Science, in the sense of the conventional 
conception of the scientific method applied in chemistry 
and physics, is not the only route to and is limited in the 
extent to which and the fields in which it and it alone can 
deliver, reliable knowledge. There is an urgent need for a 
fundamental reappraisal of the nature of knowledge and 
how it is and can better be obtained. The terms “science” 
and “scientific” are used today in medicine and other 
“soft” sciences like sociology and “political science” in 
numerous and conflicting senses that have ceased to give 
these terms a useful meaning. 
The practice of medicine is largely observational and 
functions without the level of certainty essential to science. 
As the reign of “evidence-based medicine” with its 
crippling flaws is replaced with evidence-informed 
individualized care, healthcare providers, physicians and 
surgeons will appropriately and once again better 
appreciate the importance of and application of non-
scientifically obtained evidence. Case reports and case 
series are examples fundamental to medical practice and 
education. 
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